Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
           Expanded Documents Edition

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States Official Government Edition (2011) Expanded Documentation Edition DVD-ROM

116,721 Pages of Documents

385 Hours of Audio Recordings

Financial Crisis DVD-ROM Web

These two document DVD-ROMs contain the 681 page, “Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States,” Official Government Edition (2011), and a total of 116,721 pages of documents. Also included is 385 hours of audio recordings of key figures in the financial industry.

The extra 116,040 pages are documents collected by the Commission, additional reports, transcripts of meetings, graphics, and historical material.

See Sample Pages

This official edition is complete, including all 129 pages of dissenting views and an index.

In the wake of the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression, President Barack Obama signed into law the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (Public Law 111-21) that established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to “examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States.”

This bipartisan Commission was given the mission in May 2009, to examine the causes of the U.S. financial crisis and to report its findings to the Congress, the President, and the American people. In the course of its research and investigation, the Commission reviewed millions of pages of documents, interviewed more than 700 witnesses, and held 19 days of public hearings in New York, Washington, D.C., and communities across the country that were hit hard by the crisis. Its final report includes the results of the Commission's inquiry and the Commission's conclusions as to the causes of the financial crisis based on this inquiry.

70,080 pages of letters, e-mails, court fillings, reports and other documents. The Commission used the authority it was given to issue subpoenas to compel testimony and the production of documents, but in the vast majority of instances, companies and individuals voluntarily cooperated with the inquiry.

The Commission viewed millions of pages of documents to bring the subjects it was investigating out of the realm of the abstract; it conducted case study investigations of specific financial firms, and in many cases specific facets of these institutions, that played pivotal roles in the events surrounding the crisis.

These documents were part of its inquiry into institutions that included American International Group (AIG), Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide Financial, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Moody’s, and Wachovia.

The Commission studied policies put in place by successive Congresses and administrations. The Commission examined the roles of policy makers and regulators at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (and its successor, the Federal Housing Finance Agency), the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Treasury Department.

385 hours of audio recordings of interviews conducted by staff members of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.
The 246 interviewees include: Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Board; Robert Rubin, Citigroup; George Soros, Soros Fund Management, LLC; Sandy Weill, Citigroup; Hank Greenberg, American International Group; Angelo Mozilo, Countrywide; Joe Cassano, AIG, Inc; Charles Prince, Citigroup; John Thain, Merrill Lynch; Arthur Levitt, Securities and Exchange Commission;  Harvey Pitt, SEC; Paul Volcker, Federal Reserve Board; Henry Cisneros, Department of Housing and Urban Development; Dick Fuld, Lehman Brothers; Alberto Gonzales, United States Attorney General; Robert Mueller, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Paul Krugman, Princeton University, and 226 other individuals.

“The difficulties under which the whole country is at present laboring will be richly compensated if they should lead to such a renovation of our business system as shall prevent the recurrence of similar periods of panic and disaster.” – Forward from “A Brief Account of All the Financial Panics and Commercial Revulsions in the United States, from 1690 to 1857,” written in 1857.

The financial crisis circa 2008 was not the first and likely not the last to be experienced in the United States. To add a historical perspective, six volumes have been added to this research set.

The United States Congressional report, "The Causes of the General Depression in Labor and Business," Published in 1879.

History of Crises under the National Banking System,” (1910) by O. M. W. Sprague. Sprague was Assistant Professor of Banking and Finance at Harvard University.

"Brief History of Panics and Their Periodical Occurrence in the United States," by DeCourcy W. Thom, published in 1916. A third edition of the translation of “Des Crises commerciales et de leur režtour pežriodique en France, en Angleterre et aux Ežtats-Unis", which covers financial panics in the United States from 1889-1916.

Wall Street Crash of 1929 Congressional Report - "Report of the Committee on Banking and Currency Pursuant to S.Res. 84 and S.Res. 56 and S.Res. 97, June 6, 1934." The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency held a series of hearings, also known as the Pecora Commission hearings, between 1932 and 1934. The hearings investigated stock exchange practices and their effect on American commerce, the national banking system, and the securities market. They also addressed issues of tax evasion and avoidance. The hearings led to the resignation of Charles E. Mitchell, the president of National City Bank, now know as Citibank, the consumer banking arm of Citigroup. Mitchell was investigated for his role in the bank's losses, excessive pay, and tax avoidance. There was a public outcry when J.P. Morgan, Jr. admitted to the Committee that he and many of his partners had not paid any income taxes in 1931 and 1932. The work of this committee set the stage for the Banking Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

"75 Years of American Finance," First Published in 1936. A detailed graphic presentation of American financial history from 1861 through 1938. This work was created by L. Merle Hostetler in 1936, while he was at Cleveland College of Western Reserve University, now known as Case Western Reserve University. At some point after it was printed, Hostetler added the years 1936 to 1938. Mr. Hostetler became a Financial Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in 1943. In 1953 he was made Director of Research. He resigned from the Bank in 1962 to work for Union Commerce Bank in Cleveland. "75 Years of American Finance," was originally published as a continuous timeline chart that was over 85 feet long. The complete publication is presented here, containing a page for each individual year. It also includes an index that provides a guide to the chart by subject and by year, and gives an overview of the breadth of information in the timeline.

Business Booms and Depressions since 1775.” A detailed fold out chart published in 1943. The chart shows the past trend of price inflation, federal debt, business, national income, stocks and bond yields for the United States from 1775 to 1943.

A copy of "A Brief Account of all the Financial Panics and Commercial Revulsions in the United States, from 1690 to 1857: with a More Particular History of the Two Great Revulsions of 1837 and 1857,” published in 1857. This book was compiled by members of the New York press. From the forward:

"One of the objects of this little work is to aid the public in coming to correct conclusions on this momentous subject. It consists, first, of the facts of the different periods of revulsion in our history, compiled from the records of those periods. Secondly we have presented a selection of the opinions of eminent individuals respecting the causes of revulsion."

Throughout the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's tenure, the Commission's staff developed preliminary staff reports containing factual background information on subject matters related to the Commission's public hearings. These staff reports were submitted to the Commission and the public for information, review and comment.

Graphics created by the FCIC to help illustrate a number of issues the Commission highlighted in its public hearings and in its final report.

The 30 graphics cover:

Funding for Mortgages
Subprime Mortgage Originations
U.S. Home Prices
Mortgage Delinquencies by Region
Mortgage Delinquencies by Loan Type
Household Net Worth
"Underwater" Mortgages

Traditional and Shadow Banking Systems
Asset-Backed Securities Outstanding
Compensation in Financial and Nonfinancial Sectors
Bank Borrowing and Mortgage Interest Rates
Repo Borrowing
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Outstanding
Bear Stearns Liquidity
Notional Amount and Gross Market Value of OTC Derivates Outstanding
Cost of Interbank Lending
Investments in Money Market Funds
Cost of Short-Term Borrowing
Payments to AIG Counterparties

Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Tranches
Collateralized Debt Obligations
Synthetic CDO
Selected Investors in CMLTI 2006-NC2
Buyers of Non-GSE Mortgage-Backed Securities
Rejected Loans Waived in by Selected Banks
Loan Performance in Various Mortgage-Market Segments
Impaired Securities
Securitization in Theory
Goldman Sachs's Top Derivatives Counterparties

20,834 pages of hearings and testimony transcripts from the 19 days of public hearings in New York, Washington, D.C., and communities across the United States.

An in-depth look at one particular mortgage security, documented with 3,794 pages of files. CMLTI 2006-NC2 was, in many ways, a microcosm of the mortgage market just preceding the crisis. Its 4,499 mortgages, worth $947 million, were originated by New Century, packaged into securities by Citigroup, rated by Moody's and S&P and sold to investors around the globe.

One of the components of the financial crisis that will be well remembered is the role of collateralized debt obligations. CDOs turned out to be some of the most toxic assets during the crisis. This section contains a compilation of 18,000 pages of selected CDO documents, including the offering documents and marketing materials for many of these structured products.

Includes the pitchbook and term sheet for the Goldman Sachs CDO deal ABACUS 2007-AC1. According to the Securities & Exchange Commission, Goldman Sachs sold investors this CDO which was crowded with subprime real estate exposure that was packaged with the assistance of Paulson & Company, which planned to bet that parts of the CDO would fail. The SEC found that Goldman Sachs didn’t formally disclose this to investors.

A glossary of the common terms used in FCIC's report and their definitions.


The DVD-ROM works with all versions of Windows and MAC.



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